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INSTITUTION
4OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
AS AN ETHICAL COURT FOR JUDGES By: Jaja Ahmad Jayus1 Taufiqurrohman Syahuri2 Wahyu
Nugroho3 Abstract The
4Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia has the
authority in addition to recruiting prospective Supreme Court justices, also given the authority
4to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity and behavior of judges, it must be
interpreted that the
8honor, dignity and behavior of judges must be
safeguarded so as not to fall down either due to his own actions or due to actions by other party. The legal
basis of the Judicial
8Commission is stated in the constitution of Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution,
the Judicial Commission Law (Law KY) No. 18 of 2011 as Amendments to Law Number 22 of 2004, and
5Law Number 3 of 2009 concerning Second Amendment to Law Number 14
of 1985 concerning the Supreme Court (Law
MA). The judge's decision is the judge's dignity and honor, so if the judge plays his decision, in fact he has
dropped his own dignity and honor. Likewise, if a judge's behavior is inappropriate or not in accordance with
moral code, both inside and outside his official duties, in fact he has dropped his own honor and dignity as a
judge, so this is where
19the Judicial Commission has the authority to enforce it, from the mild
sanction, moderate to
severe categories. This article discusses the institutional relationship with the Judicial Commission of the
Republic of Indonesia as an ethical court for judges, considering the independence of judges in law
enforcement practices in violation of ethical codes in various forms, thus the Judicial Commission as a
supervisory and balancing function of the judiciary (judicial power). Key words: judicial commission, judge,
ethics, court, sanctions 1 Commissioner of the
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2015 and Period 2015-2020, currently serving as Chair of the Judicial Commission, & Lecturer at the Faculty
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3 Lecturer at the Faculty of Law,
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I. Introduction Judges are the main law enforcement actors in the court who have more roles when
compared to prosecutors, lawyers and clerks. At the time it was enforced, the law began to enter the das
sein (the real) territory and left the das sollen (which should be) territory. The law is no longer just a row of
dead articles contained in a statutory regulation, but has been "turned on" by the living interpreter named
judge (A. Ahsin Tohari, 2004). In deciding a case, the judge must combine three important things, namely
legal certainty, legal usefulness, and legal justice. In that way, the legal considerations which form the basis
of the decision will be better. More than that, the judge also needs to have the ability to control thoughts that
can provide direction in thinking and acting in carrying out his judicial activities, namely moral philosophy. It
is this factor of moral philosophy that is important to ensure that the freedom of judges as law enforcers is
balanced with idealism to provide justice for justice seekers. In another sense, judicial independence must
also be balanced with judicial accountability (Blueprint for Judicial Commission Update, 2010). As we all
know, the position of judge on the one hand is a very noble position, and on the other hand, if not careful,
can lower his dignity because many temptations are ready to plunge him. Judge's position can be said to be
a position very close to worldly temptations. Imagine, in the hands of a judge the fate and future of someone
will be determined. People who were rich and famous as donors in their environment, for example, suddenly
fell as human dignity because they went to prison due to the judge's decision. Therefore, it has become a
common view that those who deal with the court will try their best, by all means (read justifying all means)
doing everything as long as the judge's decision can side with him. A good judge will decide a case
according to the truth of his knowledge, on the contrary a bad judge will decide a case not using his
knowledge, he will consciously betray the knowledge he actually knows. Therein lies the importance of the
independence of judges to be accompanied and maintained with the accountability of
39judges. The independence of judges without the accountability of
judges will potentially lead to arbitrary decisions. So the independence of judges is very
4risky to give birth to independence if without accountability and control that
is contrary to the idea of limiting power. These conditions can
give rise to a judicial tyrannical situation that marginalizes ideals to uphold law and justice. The principle of
judicial independence has attracted much attention and been critically analysed from a number of different
perspectives and, not unexpectedly, accorded different meanings. Judicial accountability, which is often
considered to complement judicial independence, is a fluid and evolving concept, the precise parameters of
which are undetermined (John Lowndes, 2016). Judges' independence is not
4in a vacuum and their independence is not absolute. Judges are not perfect
human beings and
are very likely to make mistakes, therefore the
4independence of judges must be accompanied by responsibility. Even Plato
in the past has warned of imperfections of law as the emergence of law
enforcement practices that are even in line with the law, but are contrary to
human rights and a sense of justice. Often found a
number of judges' decisions that do not have the power of morality in them. Therefore, in this article it
discusses institutional Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia as an ethical court for judges, given
the independence of judges in law enforcement practices violations of the code of ethics in various forms,
therefore the judicial commission as a supervisory and balancing function of the judiciary (judicial power).
3What exactly is meant by the concept of judicial independence? It is a
concept that suggests that judges ought to be free from influence by the
other branches of government, as well as from political, social, economic, or
other influences. For the British, judicial independence meant that judges
should be free from influence by the King or Parliament. For us in the United
States, judicial independence means that judges should be free from
influence by the executive or legislature. And in fact, judicial independence
also means that judges should be free from influence by the people. Of
course, judges are bound to follow the law, which the people may revise or
amend through their representatives in the legislature. Naturally, judges
should make their decisions according to the law, but otherwise should not
be influenced by what the executive, the legislature, or even the people
might think. Under this view, the ideal judge is a person who is learned in the
law and who is independent, so that he or she will be guided in decision,
making solely by legal knowledge and judicial experience (Jeffrey M.
Sharman,
1996). II. Discussion 1. Ethical Law Enforcement The
9Supreme Court’s independence as an institution and that of its judges is
undoubted and has lead to strong public confidence in the administration of
justice. We recognize that the purpose of judicial independence is to serve
the public, not the judges (Ian Binnie, 2011) The
emergence of a
7Judicial Commission that has the authority to conduct oversight of
(moral norms) the behavior of judges 4, is a breakthrough that engenders a shift in meaning to ethical
norms. Likewise, the MPR Stipulation on National Ethics (MPR Decree NO. VI / 2001), regulates that State
Officials will submit to the Ethics of National Life as a formula derived from religious teachings, especially
those that are universal, and the noble values of the nation's culture reflected in the Pancasila as a basic
reference in thinking and behaving in national life. The awareness of the importance of moral norms has
been realized by the Indonesian people, especially since the constitutional amendment by pouring
28a number of ethical provisions in the constitution. The 1945
12Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (hereinafter written in the 1945
Constitution)
regulates moral norms in several paragraphs. The president and vice president can be dismissed for
committing misconduct, as well as for judges and constitutional 4
8Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution states that the
18Judicial Commission has the authority to propose the appointment of justices
11and have other powers in the context of maintaining and upholding the honor,
dignity, and conduct of judges. judges and members of the judicial commission.
This means that even if there is no violation of the law of corruption for example, if they have been proven to
have committed a disgraceful act then they can be dismissed from their positions. Inclusion of moral norms
in a number of provisions in the 1945 Constitution indicates that law enforcement alone is not enough, it is
also necessary to enforce ethical norms. Ethical norms or also referred to as moral norms differ from legal
norms (Theo Huijbers, 1990). Legal norms are usually contained in a statutory regulation and strict
sanctions (J. van Kan and J.H. Beekhuis, 1977), but moral norms live in society and sanctions are not strict.
In the flow of legal positivism, Hart explained that there is no need for a relationship between moral norms
and legal norms, that is, moral norms stand alone beside legal norms (W. Friedmann, 1990).
6If a regulative norm exists, a behaviour is no longer optional. Using a
language introduced by Herbert Hart that produced a turning point in legal
theory, normativity can be understood in terms of justificatory reasons for
action. There are different kinds of reasons and norms, and the law is one of
them. Although Kelsen did not use this language, he would accept that if
something is normative it binds behaviour. The relevant point here is that
Kelsen and Hart can coherently assert that normativity is one of the
essential features of every legal system precisely because they clearly
distinguish legal normativity form moral normativity. By asserting that the
law is normative, they are not attributing any moral property to it. Legal
normativity does not constitute nor imply moral normativity
(Maria Cristina Redondo, 2019). However, not all of the two norms must always be separated, because in
other parts the two norms are sometimes difficult to separate. Fuller said that law and morals cannot be
separated because the concept of law itself contains moral values (Suri Ratnapala, 2009). For example: the
norm is prohibited from killing, prohibited from cheating, prohibited from stealing and is not allowed to
slander. All examples of prohibition norms are also legal norms which also contain elements of moral norms.
Indeed, it would be better if a moral norm is used as a legal norm through legislation or joint regulations,
thus it can be subject to strict sanctions, unlike sanctions imposed on violations of moral norms. The
distinction betwen law and morality was delimitated rather slowly. In the primitive stages of the social life
there was an indistinct tradition, consisting in norms with a mixed character, in other words an obligatory
force little defined in its moral or legal nature. (Bogdan Cristian Trandafirescu, 2007). In addition, the level of
adherence to legal norms containing moral norms is expected to be better because basically the community
has long known these norms in the form of moral norms that are rooted in conscience. 2. Supervision of
Judges’ Behavior As Hart mentioned above that moral norms (ethics) need not relate to legal norms. But
now it has developed the thought of the need for moral norms to be adopted as legal norms in a law. In this
case,
40Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution
jo.
5Law Number 22 of 2004 concerning the Judicial Commission (hereinafter
referred to
as Law KY) can be used as a concrete example that moral norms can be adopted into legal norms.
Therefore, violation of the norm will result in strict sanctions, even if not in a criminal sentence, because the
violation
30is a violation of the judge's code of conduct. For example, a judge
who commits a despicable act, which when viewed from a legal standpoint, has not yet reached the
qualifications of a criminal offense, but is still threatened with sanctions, namely sanctions for violating
ethics. Therefore, the Judicial Commission has the role as the first guard in efforts to prevent violations of
the law committed by the judges. A judge who negotiates with a party regarding a decision has been
deemed to have violated a heavy code of ethics even though in the negotiations there has been no
handover of valuables or money as bribes. So the act of his speech has not yet occurred but the act of
violation of his code of ethics has occurred, and here KY is allowed to investigate it. With a strict ethical
supervision of judges' behavior accompanied by the threat of administrative sanctions, it will make judges
think twice or thrice when they want to commit unlawful acts. Only violating ethics is already given sanctions,
especially if it violates the law. If the judge's behavior is well preserved, then the people's expectation to
obtain a fair court decision will be easily realized. Judges who don't violate ethical norms are good judges,
and good judges make good decisions (Abdulkadir Muhammad, 2001). As an example the application of
ethical norms can be seen in The Bangalore Principles (hereinafter written Bangalore Principles), which




2Ethical principles reflect the core values of the judiciary and provide a soul
to the conduct of court and to individual judges. Ethics means an intention
to make well, with the aim of the common good in the exercise of a task.40 It
is a process; not something static. Ethical principles incarnate constitutional
and lawful obligations of judges and describe the ways they must be
administered. In addition, the principles set the standards of professional
activity for judges and describe main features of a professional judge.
Finally, they explain clearly to the society the way justice is administered,
seeking the confidence for judges in individual cases and for the courts and
judiciary in general. The systematic construction of ethical norms is one of
the main issues that countries face while establishing documents on judicial
ethics. The content of judicial
2ethics requires constant and continuing comparative research, because the
permanent rise of new judicial ethical dilemmas leads to renewable contents.
In this article, the author sets the goal to make a comprehensive list of
principles of judicial ethics that enables developers of judicial ethics to test
existing regulation and to improve possible reforms (Mindaugas Šimonis, 2017).
The
Bangalore Principle is a code of ethics for judges' conduct that is compiled and agreed upon by
representatives of judges from various countries as a guide to the behavior of judges everywhere. The
Bangalore Principles Agreement was first coined in Bangalore, India, in February 2001. The last meeting in
The Hague in November 2002, which produced a draft entitled "The Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct" which produced six basic ethical principles of judges, namely: (1) freedom,
29(2) impartiality, (3) integrity, (4) politeness, (5) equality, and (6) competence
and obedience. The six principles
can be briefly outlined as follows: (The
2Bangalore Principles Of Judicial Conduct, 2002).
1. Freedom
20is a prerequisite for the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee for a fair
trial. Therefore a judge must uphold and
give an example of judicial freedom; 2. Impartiality is very important that a judge in carrying out his duties
does not expect compensation, and without prejudice. A judge must ensure that his behavior, both inside
and outside the court, is maintained; 3. Integrity regulates that a judge must ensure that his behavior is not
blameworthy from a reasonable observation point of view; 4. Propriety/ Politeness requires that a judge
avoid inappropriate behavior and image in all judge's activities, and must be willing to
16accept personal restrictions that may be considered burdensome by the
public; 5. Equality, ensure equal treatment of all people before the court.
16A judge must be aware of and understand the diversity of society arising
from various sources,
such as skin color, religion, beliefs, sex, and ethnicity; 6. Competence and obediences, place the judge in
the position of devoting his professional activities above all other activities. A judge will take serious steps to
improve his knowledge, expertise and personal qualities to carry out his duties. The
1chief weakness of the Bangalore Principles lies in their enforcement. There
are two facets to the enforcement problem. First, the Bangalore Principles of
Judicial Conduct, like other judicial independence standards, are not
contained in a binding document under international law. States are not
bound to comply with their provisions in the same manner that they are with
regard to international treaties. Unlike other international standards on
judicial independence, it would be difficult to argue that the principles reflect
customary international law. They have been developed outside traditional
UN processes for generating international standards, lowering their status
and creating the theoretical risk that they might be inappropriately amended
by states if their adoption is sought by the international community. This fear
may be unfounded as the UN Commission on Human Rights in resolution
2003/43 – adopted without a vote – noted the Bangalore Principles without
amendment and brought them to the attention of member states for
consideration. Furthermore, at the 2006 session of the UN Economic and
Social Council, member states were invited to encourage their judiciaries to
consider the principles in the process of developing or reviewing
professional standards of conduct. The resolution also envisages the
creation of an open-ended intergovernmental expert group that would
prepare a commentary on the principles in cooperation with the Judicial
Group. Second, the Bangalore Principles appear to offer guidance to
members of the judiciary, rather than to set out directly enforceable
standards of behaviour, and therefore may not have a direct impact on
improving judicial conduct. The standards contained are not expressed in a
manner that enables their direct application or incorporation into domestic
law as enforceable rules of conduct. Nor do they specify the standard or
burden of proof, or the types and scale of penalties that can be imposed for
an infraction. In terms of implementation they simply call upon national
judiciaries to adopt effective measures to provide implementation
mechanisms if they are currently not in existence. They do not elaborate
further on what an appropriate mechanism for the enforcement of the
standards contained therein should look like, apart from the fact that it
should be generated from within the judiciary, although other international
standards on judicial independence may provide some guidance in that
respect (Greg Mayne, 2007). Despite these weaknesses, a key strength of the
Bangalore Principles is their recognition that judiciaries are not passive
players in terms of maintaining the independence, impartiality and
effectiveness of a judicial system, and therefore its integrity, but must be
active in maintaining appropriate standards of judicial conduct and
performance. Other instruments elaborated by the international community
have tended to dismiss the need for standards of conduct for the judiciary
and the role of the judiciary in this regard, and emphasise the
responsibilities of the state. The promulgation of the principles outside the
traditional UN or inter-governmental processes indicates a growing
awareness among judges that efforts to strengthen judicial independence
need also to strengthen judicial accountability and that judges themselves
must
14play an active role in upholding high standards of conduct in order to
contribute to the strengthening and institutionalisation of judicial
independence. (Greg Mayne, 2007). The
legal rules related to the task of supervising judges' behavior are scattered in various
12laws and regulations. They are the 1945 Constitution
Article 24B, Judicial Commission Law (Law KY) No. 18 of 2011 as Amendments to Law 22 of 2004,
5Law Number 3 of 2009 concerning Second Amendment to Law Number 14
of 1985 regarding the Supreme Court (Law
MA),
7Law No. 49, 50 & 51 of 2009 concerning General Courts
(Law PU), Religious Courts (Law PA), and State Administrative Courts (Law PTUN). Along with the issuance
of the Supreme Court Act 2009 above the Judicial Commission together with the Supreme Court on April 8,
2009 has ratified the Joint Decree (SKB)
5on the Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct
for Judges (KE & PPH) which regulates the ethics and behavior of prohibited judges. KE
4(Code of Ethics)& PPH (Judges' Code of Conduct) are also one of the
ethical norms that have been positively promoted thus they have strict sanctions that apply to judges. The
contents of the Code of Ethics (KE) & PPH basically contain about 10 principles, namely (1) Behaving Fairly,
(2) Being Honest, (3) Behaving Arif and Wise, (4) Being Independent, (5) High Integrity, (5) 6) Responsible,
(7) Uphold Self-Esteem, (8) High Discipline, (9) Be Humble, and (10) Be Professional5. KE & PPH
regulation above
22is in line with the provisions in Article 11A paragraph (1) letter F of the
Supreme Court Law which in essence states that the Supreme Judge can be dishonorably discharged if it
violates the KE & PPH. The above provisions are concrete forms of the application of strict sanctions against
violations of ethical norms. Then Article 11A paragraph (6) of the Supreme Court 5 Number 8.1.8.2.8.3. and
8.4 and 10.1. 10.2.10.3. and 10.4 are declared as having no legal force by the Judicial Review Decision
Material of the Joint MA and KY concerning the
17Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judges.
However Figures 8 (plain) and 10 (plain) are not deleted. This means that the Disciplinary and Professional
Chapters still exist whose application is the authority of Members of the Judicial Commission's Panel or
Plenary Session. Law states that the Supreme Judge who violates KE & PPH has the
5right to defend himself before the Honorary Board of Judges (MKH) before the
Supreme Court and / or Judicial Commission proposes the dismissal of sanctions. With the affirmation of the
article, the Judicial Commission together with the Supreme Court can hold MKH. MA Supreme Court
regulation above has become a reference for the drafting of PU Law, PA Law and PTUN Law, thus judges
under the Supreme Court also have the same defense rights before MKH. 3. Imposition of Sanctions
Mechanism Judges found guilty of violating KE and PPH were severely sanctioned with dishonorable
discharge by the Judicial Commission Ethics Session. Before the sanctions have binding force, the judge in
question must be given the opportunity to defend himself before the MKH hearing)6. Then MKH delivered
the sanction to the Supreme Court to be implemented. So far (before 2013) the heavy sanctions imposed by
KY on judges were violations of the KE and PPH related to criminal acts such as being a case broker,
accepting bribes, and getting part of the object of the case. Actually this matter has entered into the realm of
criminal law, so the sanction of dismissal should be accompanied by a report of criminal actions to law
enforcement according to the type of case.. Behavior related to criminal act is no longer an ethical issue,
because ethical issues are only related to matters that are proper or inappropriate, bad or good, the legal
sanctions are certainly different from the penalties. KY was not present to punish criminal offenders but
rather as guardians and enforcers of
38honor, dignity and behavior of judges both inside and outside the
trial. The judge's behavior in the trial can manifest in the manner of presiding over the hearing and other
behaviors in the hearing, such as partiality in leading the trial, lying in formulating his legal opinion, or
deliberately ignored evidence or facts of the trial. Such judge behavior is clearly bad or inappropriate
behavior. Examples of out-of-court behavior include gambling, drunkenness, meeting with litigants, and
doing despicable or immoral behavior. Behavior of such judges has committed acts that demean the
37honor, dignity, and behavior of themselves, to the judge who proved to
be reasonable if imposed sanctions. This sanction is not merely a punishment but also a rescue of judicial
institutions and the maintenance and upholding of the honor of the noble conduct of judges. Conversely, if
the honor, dignity and behavior of judges are dropped by another party, then according to the Judicial
Commission Law No. 18 of 2011 Article 20 paragraph (1) c, KY may take legal or other steps against those
who demean the judge's dignity. The mechanism for imposing sanctions is a problem if the sanctions given
by KY against judges are medium category sanctions, such as temporary termination by delaying promotion
or non-hammer for a certain time. Some of these sanctions up to now have not been implemented or
executed by the Supreme Court. For judges who are proposed with severe sanctions such as dismissal,
8will be given the opportunity to conduct self-defense in the
MKH session. It could be 6 Article 11 (6)
36Law Number 3 of 2009 concerning the Supreme Court.
after making a defense at MKH 7, the sanction may turn into a mild sanction in the form of a warning, or it
may even be released because according to MKH there is not enough evidence. For light sanctions it is still
open for judges to participate in the selection of prospective justices. Therefore judges who have been
sentenced to dismissal either by KY or by the Supreme Court but have never been given the opportunity to
conduct self-defense at the MKH session are a great loss for the judge himself. After the New KY Act came
into effect, namely Law Number 18 of 2011, the sanctions imposed by the KY Plenary Session on the
Reported Judge, in addition to dismissal, automatically took place after 60 days the Supreme Court did not
show an attitude of disapproval. If the Supreme Court feels objected to the
8sanctions proposed by the Judicial Commission,
then a joint examination
31by the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court. In the case of
a joint examination no agreement was found, then KY proposals
5apply automatically and must be implemented by the Supreme Court
(see Articles 22D and 22E). For dismissal sanctions,
19the Judicial Commission proposed to the Supreme Court to be formed by the
MKH with members of the panel consisting of 4 KY members and 3 members of the Supreme Court Judge.
MKH checks and decides the alleged violation of
18the Code of Ethics and / or the Code of Conduct of Judges
proposed by KY or MA within 60 days from the receipt of the proposal. MKH decisions must be implemented
by the Supreme Court within a 30-day deadline from the date the decision was made (Article 22F). 4.
Judicial Commission as Ethics Court Under the Constitution of the Judicial Commission then formed by
calling two constitutional authorities. They were to select prospective judges and to have
21other powers in order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and
behavior of judges. The other authority of the Judicial Commission to maintain and
uphold the
4honor, dignity and behavior of judges must be interpreted that the
8honor, dignity and behavior of judges must not be
kept from falling down either due to their own actions or due to the actions of other parties. The judge's
decision is the judge's dignity and honor, so if the judge plays his decision, in fact he has dropped his own
dignity and honor. Likewise, if the judge's behavior is inappropriate or not in accordance with the moral code,
both inside and outside his official duties, in fact he has dropped his own honor and dignity as a judge. This
is where the Judicial Commission is present to enforce it. Constitutionally it is clearly stated that the guardian
and enforcer of a judge's behavior is the task of the Judicial Commission, not another institution. Then it is a
constitutional error if there are other institutions given the authority to guard or handle the behavior of
judges. However, the 2009 Judicial Act and the 2009 Supreme Court Act stated that internal control over
judges' behavior is 7 Read:
10Keputusan Bersama Ketua Mahkamah Agung RI dan Ketua Komisi
Yudisial RI Nomor 047/KMA/SKB/IV/2009 dan 02/SKB/P.KY/IV/2009 Tentang
Kode Etik dan Pedoman Perilaku Hakim.
carried out by
34the Supreme Court. The formulation of the Supreme Court as the supervisor of
the
judge's behavior creates confusion if juxtaposed
7with the authority of the Judicial Commission as the guardian and enforcer of the
judges'
behavior as mandated
25in Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution. Likewise it is a constitutional error if the
Judicial Commission by law is given the task of supervising or evaluating Judges' verdicts, because the
matter of judges' decisions is a judicial affair which
15is the duty and authority of the Supreme Court
as
12regulated in Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution. The definition of
attitude and behavior clearly has the same meaning, namely the action including the attitude of the judge.
Thus the formulation of the task of supervising the behavior or behavior of judges by institutions other than
the Judicial Commission is actually an unconstitutional formula, not in accordance with Article 24B of the
1945 Constitution. In addition to being unconstitutional, it also complicates and results in a waste of the
State budget because in practice
5between the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court conducted by the
Supervisory Agency (Bawas) is often in conflict because the object of supervision is the same judge. The
Reported Judge examined by the Judicial Commission is often re-examined by the Supreme Court
Supervisory Board in the same case and also vice versa, of course this is detrimental to the judge as the
Reported Party. The presence of the Judicial Commission as a supervisor of the actual behavior of judges is
also expected by the
22Supreme Court as can be seen in the initial idea of
the formation of the MPPH (Judicial Research Advisory Panel) in 1968. MPPH is expected to assume the
function of giving recommendations for appointment, promotion, dismissal and acts of punishment
(Secretariat General of the Judicial Commission, t.th). With this position, the function of the Judicial
Commission is basically
33closely related to the function of the judicial authority (judicial) as is the
case with court institutions. If the court of law institution has the function to adjudicate legal cases, the
Judicial Commission also has the function as a court of ethics which hears the ethical cases (behavior) of
the judges (Jimly Asshiddiqie, 2013), therefore it is time for the general principles of modern courts to apply
also to the ethical courts in the Judicial Commission. MKH (Honorary Panel of Judges) which is conducted
openly has shown that the ethical court hearing has fulfilled the principles of the court of law. Thus the
Chapter of Judicial Power listed in the 1945 Constitution must now be read not only by
28judicial authority in the field of law
24carried out by the Supreme Court along with the court under it and
a Constitutional Court, but also includes judicial power in the field of ethics carried out
23by the Judicial Commission. So the placement of the Judicial Commission in
the
Chapter of Justice was correct. As a comparative law, before 1985 Indonesian people only knew the
7General Courts, Religious Courts, and Military Courts, but after 1985 the
community recognized the
State Administrative Court institutions whose object of dispute was a decree from an administrative official,
which of course at the beginning of its appearance by the public was seen "Strange" is not uncommon. Then
at the beginning of the reforms after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution of 2003 the community was
introduced to the State Constitutional Court institution conducted by the Constitutional Court with the
authority to, among other things, adjudicate laws and dispute the authority of state institutions, as well as the
birth of the Ethics Court conducted
23by the Judicial Commission with the object of
non-legal cases namely the ethical norms that are arranged in the
17Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judges. So now the
community has been introduced to six models of court institutions namely
32the General Courts, Religious Courts, Military Courts, Administrative Courts,
Administrative Courts and
Ethical Courts. In the general election organizer known as the Ethics Court conducted by the Election
Management Honorary Board (DKPP). 5. Experience of the Honorary Panel of Judges The experience of
the
5Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court organizing the Honorary Panel of
Judges often issued
5Law Number 3 of 2009 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number
14 of 1985 concerning the Supreme Court. Article 11A
paragraph (6) provides that
5before the Supreme Court and / or the Judicial Commission submit proposals
for dismissal from both the
7Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission, the Supreme Court
5justices have the right to defend themselves before the Honorary Panel of
Judges.
A similar mechanism was used by judges in all Supreme Court circles as
5Law Number 49 of 2009 concerning Second Amendment to Law Number 2
of 1986 concerning General Courts
was passed. Is Judge Sudarto who is the
24Chair of the Banjarmasin District Court. The decision of the
Honorary Panel of Judges for the first time on September 29, 2009 dismissed the judge disrespectfully
because Judge Sudarto requested a sum of money and facilities from the litigants.. Since the hearing of the
Honorary Panel of Judges was held for the first time, 19 decisions of the Honorary Board of Judges have
been passed. Decisions of the Honorary Panel of Judges with respect to dismissal from the position of judge
/ justices as many as 7 (seven) decisions, the rest in the form of sanctions with respect to dismissal not on
their own request, and sanction of judicial judges for a certain time. Of the 19 decisions of the Honorary
Panel of Judges, 10 (ten) of which are proposed by the Judicial Commission, the rest are proposals from the
Supreme Court. Decision of the Honorary Panel of Judges is a decision related to the dismissal of the
Honorable Chief Justice Ahmad Yamani. As the only supreme court judge who was dishonorably dismissed,
Ahmad Yamani was fired for changing the decision on the conviction of convicted Hanky Gunawan from a
15-year prison sentence to 12 years as a judicial review panel had decided. This was done by inserting
three new lines of consideration in the previously agreed draft decision, namely a 15-year prison sentence.
The experience of holding an Honorary Panel of Judges was also colored by dissenting opinions. Judges'
Honorary Council Decisions Number 02 / MKH / XI / 2009 and 03 / MKH / XI / 2009 also have disenting
opinions. The request for a sum of money made by the reported judge to the reported party is the reason for
the submission of Judge Ari Siswanto and Judge Aldhytia Kurniyansa Sudewa to the Honorary Panel of
Judges. Certainly both are
11recommended by the Judicial Commission to be dismissed from the post of
judge. In its decision on December 14, 2009, the Honorary Panel of Judges imposed sanctions as a judicial
judge, demotion 1 (one) lower with the legal consequences reduced remuneration allowance of 100% while
serving as a judicial judge. Legal considerations in 2 (two) decisions of the Honorary Panel of Judges
contain disenting opinions. In the decision of the Honorary Panel of Judges with reported judge Ari
Siswanto, Artidjo Alkostar (chief judge of the Honorary Panel of Judges from the Supreme Court elements)
and Zainal Arifin (judge members of the Honorary Board of Judges of the Supreme Court elements) who
expressed differences of opinion that the reported judge was dismissed with no respect as a judge. Whereas
the decision of the Honorary Panel of Judges and reported judge Aldhytia Kurniyansa Sudewo, Zainal Arifin
is consistent with the recommendation of the Judicial Commission to dismiss the reported judge with
respect. The establishment of a Judge Honorary Council which is a forum of self- defense by judges in the
mechanism for dismissing judges is relevant to the urgency of establishing a Judicial Commission as
referred to above. The study of legal politics further explores the main idea of establishing an Honorary
Panel of Judges as part of the supervisory mechanism of judges, especially in dismissing judges. Political
study of law related to the Honorary Council of Judges will confirm the existence of legal policy from the
legislators in balancing the position of the
15Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission in the mechanism of dismissing
judges. The establishment of
the Honorary Council of Judges further emphasized the country's commitment to make improvements to the
independence of an accountable judicial power. From the experience of forming the Honorary Panel of
Judges above, 24 Honorary Board Judges have been held. Establishment of Honorary Panel of Judges with
these figures, 12 proposals
41from the Supreme Court and 12 from the Judicial Commission.
A total of 13 judges have been dismissed through the Honorary Panel of Judges. The formation of the
Honorary Panel of Judges in accordance with the legal politics of its formation, among others: a. The
Honorary Panel of Judges is able to act
4against judges who violate the Code
of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judges. This can be seen from the experience of the formation of the
Honorary Panel of Judges capable of acting against judges who violated the Code of Ethics and the Code of
Conduct for Judges because of several violations such as receiving gifts from litigants, communicating with
litigants, and immoral acts; b. The establishment of a Judge Honorary Council is a concrete step in
supervising judges. Both external oversight by the Judicial Commission and internal oversight by the
Supreme Court, the Honorary Panel of Judges are repressive measures in taking action against judges who
violate the Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct of Judges in the framework of supervising judges; c.
The establishment of the Honorary Panel of Judges has carried out repressive judicial oversight functions as
a defense forum for judges who violate the Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judges,
independently and not influenced by executive or legislative powers in imposing sanctions on judges; d. The
establishment of the Honorary Panel of Judges is a form of balance of authority between the Supreme Court
as an internal supervisor and the Judicial Commission as an external supervisor, in following up on the
proposed dismissal of the judge. Therefore, there is no dominant institution in both the Supreme Court and
the Judicial Commission in proposing the dismissal of judges as well as deciding; e. The formation of the
Honorary Panel of Judges supports the implementation of the
15independence of the judicial authority and accountability of the
judicial authority. The establishment of a Judge Honorary Council is part of a repressive effort to crack down
on
13judges who violate the Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judges.
Actions
4against judges who violate the Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for
Judges through the Honorary Council of
Judges are relevant to the spirit of building a judge's mentality thus they are independent in examining,
adjudicating, and deciding cases. In addition, the
25exercise of judicial power is accountable in accordance with the
principles contained in
13the Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judges. III. Conclusion Based
on the discussion above, the
conclusion of this article can be given, that the judge as the judge of justice must be guaranteed
independence, he must not be influenced by anyone. An independent judge will provide equal and open
opportunity for each party to be heard without relating it to the identity or social position of the parties. An
independent judge will be impartial, free from unrelated influence and immune from outside pressure. An
independent judge decides on the basis of honesty, based on the law as he knows it, regardless of personal,
political or financial consequences. Judges are considered as representatives of God above the world, and
whatever decision is true (res judicata pre veritate habetur) regardless of whether when deciding a judge is
influenced by wrong behavior or contrary to law and ethics. The
4Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia (KY RI) has the role as the
first guard in efforts to prevent ethical and legal violations committed by judges. A judge negotiating with a
litigant regarding a decision has been deemed to have violated a severe code of ethics even though the
negotiations did not yet take place of valuables or money as bribes. The criminal act has not yet occurred,
but the violation of the code of ethics has already occurred, and here KY can investigate it, thus the Judicial
Commission only conducts investigations until the conviction for ethical violations has been given a sanction,
especially if it violates the law. If the judge's behavior is well preserved, then the people's expectation to
obtain a fair court decision will be easily realized. The existence and function of the Judicial Commission is
very much
7related to the function of the judicial authority (judicial) as is the case with court
institutions. If the court of law has the function of adjudicating legal cases, the Judicial Commission also has
the function of an ethical court which adjudicates the ethical cases (behavior) of the judges, so it is time that
the general principles of the modern court apply for an ethical court in the Judicial Commission. MKH
(Honorary Panel of Judges) which is conducted openly has shown that the ethical court hearing has fulfilled
the principles of the court of law.
